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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical. Police officers conduct a lawful search of a house belonging to a suspected drug dealer. During
the search, the police escort the suspect and two other occupants—a
male and a female—outside. Officers place the suspect into the
backseat of a police cruiser and then separate and handcuff the two
occupants.
A few minutes later, a detective approaches the female occupant
while she is still handcuffed and begins to question her. He assures
her that she is not under arrest and that the restraints are only for
safety. What starts off as an ordinary identification inquiry leads to
more investigatory questions, and eventually, she makes an incriminating statement. While the female occupant is being questioned,
another detective approaches the suspect, who is still in the backseat
of the police cruiser, and begins to question him. Eventually, he, too,
provides incriminating information.
After officers finish questioning the suspect and the female occupant, they release the male occupant from handcuffs. The police
begin to ask him a few identification questions. Suddenly, the male
occupant starts to pull something out of his pocket—presumably his
driver’s license to prove his identification—and the police draw their
weapons. They order him to lie flat on the ground, and with their
‡ J.D. Candidate 2016, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Samuel Wiseman for his guidance and insight during the writing process;
my friends and family, especially my mother, Desaree, for always supporting me throughout my endeavors; my colleague and best friend, Meredith Fee, for her wonderful assistance and feedback; and the editors of the Florida State University Law Review for their
expert editing and thoughtful suggestions.
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weapons still drawn, one of the officers pats him down while another
asks if he has any weapons on him. The male occupant responds that
his weapon is not on him and that it is back in the house.
At no time do the police read any of the three individuals their
Miranda rights.1 Are any of them considered to be in custody for
purposes of Miranda at any time in the hypothetical? Many courts
would vary on this analysis but would likely arrive at the same conclusion: all three individuals were in custody at the time of the
questioning and therefore were entitled to Miranda rights. However, most of those courts would also find that the application of the
handcuffs, the placement of the suspect into the backseat of the police cruiser, and the officers’ drawing of weapons are not dispositive
factors; instead, each is only one factor among several to consider in
custody determinations.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that “[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”2 It was not until Miranda v. Arizona,
however, that the United States Supreme Court concluded that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed
outside of court proceedings and that procedural safeguards are
necessary to protect this constitutional privilege during inherently
coercive custodial interrogations. 3 The Court would later come to
define “custodial interrogation”—discussed in greater length in Part
I of this Note—as an “interrogation” of an individual who is taken
into “custody.”4
This Note will focus primarily on “custody,” its development
through the common law, and the particular coercive actions taken
by law enforcement that are commonly associated with formal arrest—or arrest-like restraints. Courts have consistently held that arrest-like restraints, such as those described in the hypothetical, do
not necessarily render a suspect in custody for purposes of Miranda.5
This assertion is flawed in many respects and would strike a reasonable person as rather odd, not to mention that it is contrary to the
1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.”).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 467 (“[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant
way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”).
4. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (holding that “Miranda
safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express
questioning or its functional equivalent.”).
5. See infra Part II.
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purposes behind Miranda. If a suspect has been subjected to these or
other arrest-like restraints, it is more likely that he or she is “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, yet an exception to the general rule
may be available that still allows for the admissibility of his or her
statements. It is also possible for a suspect to be taken out of custody
if the arrest-like restraint has been removed prior to any questioning.
Part I of this Note explains the legal developments that led to the
current test for custodial interrogation. The Court has come to distinguish custody and arrest, interpreting custody as being more than
just the physical restraint on the freedom of movement associated
with arrest and including the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.6 Part II demonstrates how federal and state courts have applied, under various interpretations, the test for custody. Part III
proposes a bright-line rule governing arrest-like restraints and explains how the current exceptions to Miranda remedy any issues
posed by a bright-line rule, such as over- and under-inclusiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Part I.A provides a brief overview of the decisions that have ultimately led to the current test for custody under Miranda. It is important to discuss Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,7 as it plays a
significant role in custody determinations. Acknowledging this importance, Part I.B discusses the development of certain cases in the
Fourth Amendment context that have impacted Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence, and it further stresses the important distinctions between custody in the Fifth and Fourth Amendment contexts.
A. Miranda and Its Progeny
The landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona 8 represented the
beginning of greater protection for the rights of suspects during police investigations. The decision stood for the proposition that the
prosecution may not introduce statements made by a criminal defendant during a custodial interrogation unless the prosecution can
demonstrate that procedural safeguards were employed to apprise
the defendant of his rights prior to any questioning and that after
6. See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012).
7. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.”).
8. Miranda was an aggregate decision of four separate cases, each one involving an
individual who had been questioned by police after being deprived of his freedom of movement in a significant way without first being apprised of his rights. See Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 444, 491-99.
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such warning was given, the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver.9 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, explained
that a suspect must be informed that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be admissible in court, that
he has the right to legal counsel both before and during questioning,
and that the government will appoint him counsel if he cannot afford
it.10 The suspect must be afforded the opportunity to exercise any of
these rights throughout the interrogation, and if he chooses to do so,
the police must scrupulously honor his invocation.11 The Court recognized that the modern practice of custodial interrogation could be
psychologically coercive, rather than just physical, and the four cases
before it in Miranda illustrated how such practice had the potential
to elicit involuntary confessions.12
The Court also held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applies to areas outside of court proceedings and
extends to all settings where an individual’s freedom of movement is
curtailed in any significant way.13 However, the Court failed to identify the circumstances in which an individual’s freedom of movement
is curtailed in a significant way. In the cases addressed in the Miranda decision, there was very little doubt that the individual defendants were in custody and that their incriminating statements
had been the results of direct questioning.14 The Court later elaborated in Rhode Island v. Innis, noting that Miranda warnings are required when an individual is taken into custody and is subjected to
interrogation, or more specifically, “express questioning or its functional equivalent.”15 When analyzing whether interrogation has occurred, the Court will not only examine the express questioning, it
will also examine whether the police should have known that their
words and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the defendant.16
In the years following the Miranda decision, custody in the Fifth
Amendment context was presumed when a suspect’s freedom to leave
was restricted in any way.17 In California v. Beheler, the Court nar9. Id. at 444, 479. The Court has further established that information unknown to a
suspect has no bearing on whether he “knowingly” waived his Miranda rights, even if that
information would have changed his decision to waive. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
422 (1986).
10. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70.
11. See id. at 444-45.
12. See id. at 448.
13. Id. at 467.
14. Leslie A. Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH.
U. L. REV. 727, 753-54, 768 (1999).
15. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
16. Id. at 301.
17. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977).
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rowly construed the test for custody as whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, there had been “a ‘formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”18 The rationale behind this decision was that every interview of
a suspect by a police officer will naturally carry certain coercive aspects, “simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a
law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to
be charged with a crime.”19 The Court alluded to the fact that this
narrow test would not be the only focus when determining whether a
suspect was in custody but that it would be the “ultimate inquiry.”20
The Court modified the Beheler test for custody in Thompson v.
Keohane, focusing on the added inquiry of whether “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave.” 21 The Court reiterated that the “ultimate
inquiry” still rested on that of the original Beheler test: whether freedom of movement had been restricted to the degree of formal arrest.22
Beheler remained the test for nearly three decades, and courts
remained divided on what constituted “restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 23 In 2012,
the Court reexamined the test for custody in Howes v. Fields and
found that “custody” is simply a term of art used to specify the circumstances under which the danger of coercion is likely to be present.24 Howes involved Randall Fields, a prisoner who was serving a
sentence in a Michigan jail and who was believed to have engaged
in sexual conduct with a child before he came to prison.25 Police interviewed Fields in a conference room where they told him he was
free to leave and return to his cell; they did not restrain him, and
although the police were armed, weapons were never drawn. 26
Fields confessed during the interview after being confronted with
the allegations.27
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, expressed that the Keohane
inquiry of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave

18. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
19. Id. at 1124.
20. Id. at 1125.
21. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
22. Id.
23. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
24. Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012).
25. Id. at 1185.
26. Id. at 1186.
27. Id.
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is the initial step for determining whether a person is in custody.28
This requires a court to examine the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, considering all relevant factors, such as location, duration, the use of physical restraints, whether the suspect was permitted to leave after questioning, and the statements made during the
interview.29 The Court explained that not all restrictions on the freedom of movement would amount to custody.30 In fact, restraint on
freedom of movement “identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient
condition for Miranda custody.” 31 It is the restraint on freedom of
movement coupled with the same inherently coercive pressures as
the type of station-house questioning present in Miranda that
amounts to Fifth Amendment custody.32
It is not certain how much the Howes test for custody will impact
the overall analyses of both federal and state courts in determining
custody. However, the underlying rationale established in Howes—
that restriction on the freedom of movement is a necessary, but not a
sufficient, factor, and that the overall coerciveness of the interrogation is the main focus—only strengthens the argument for finding
custody in almost every case where arrest-like restraints are present.
B. Terry Stops and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been vastly intertwined
with Miranda and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Unsurprisingly,
only two years after the Warren Court decided Miranda and shifted
the scales in favor of protecting the rights of suspects, the Court delivered another landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, shifting the
scales back in favor of crime control.33 In Terry, the Court held that
where a police officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is occurring in his presence, it is reasonable for him
to stop and temporarily detain the suspect until his suspicion has
been dispelled.34 Terry also provided that an officer who reasonably
believes that a suspect is armed and dangerous may conduct a limited search, or “frisk,” of the suspect’s outer garments for the purpose
of confiscating any weapons that may be used to harm him or others. 35 Both the “stop”—a warrantless seizure—and the “frisk”—a
28. Id. at 1189.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1190 (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See id. at 1189-90.
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. Id. at 30.
35. Id.
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warrantless search—are deemed reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 36 The holding in Terry struck a balance between the
competing interests of individual Fourth Amendment liberties and
effective crime prevention and public safety.37
The Court expanded the Terry doctrine to traffic stops in Berkemer
v. McCarty.38 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, explained
that an ordinary traffic stop was different from a stationhouse interrogation in many respects, particularly duration and intimidation.39
Berkermer began to draw some of the most important distinctions
between Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Although a
motorist’s freedom of movement is curtailed during a traffic stop, the
atmosphere surrounding the stop is much less coercive than the
kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda.40 The motorist in a traffic
stop has been “seized” of his person for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment; however, he is not in custody for purposes of Miranda.41
This is not to say that a traffic stop cannot elevate into a custodial
stop, which would warrant full protections to the motorist under Miranda.42 Berkemer led to the expansion of Terry, which some courts
have come to interpret as standing for the proposition that Miranda
warnings are almost never required to be given during an investigatory stop,43 further contributing to the confusion over when a suspect
is considered to be in custody.
The Court’s decision in Howes aptly pointed out the significant
difference between custody in the Fourth Amendment context and
custody in the Miranda context.44 The Court recognized that Berkemer declined to extend the protections of Miranda to routine traffic
stops because the detention was nonthreatening, relatively brief, and
unlikely to raise the same concerns regarding coerciveness present in
Miranda.45 It is this subtle difference that weighs so heavily in favor
of courts finding Miranda custody when a suspect is subjected to arrest-like restraints. Keohane modified the Beheler test, adding the
additional inquiry of whether a reasonable person would have felt
free to leave.46 Howes took a less formalistic approach by introducing
36. See id. at 30-31.
37. Id. at 22-24.
38. 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984).
39. Id. at 437-38.
40. See id. at 438-39.
41. See id. at 436-37, 441.
42. See id. at 440.
43. See Katherine M. Swift, Drawing a Line Between Terry and Miranda: The Degree
and Duration of Restraint, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1075, 1083-84 (2006).
44. See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1190 (2012).
45. See id. at 1189-90.
46. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
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a more subjective analysis with relevant factors that take into account the circumstances surrounding the actual interrogation.47 It is
unlikely that a driver or passenger would feel free to leave during a
traffic stop, for doing so would be a crime.48 Freedom of movement is
restrained significantly during traffic stops—regardless of whether
arrest-like restraints are present—but given the inherent coerciveness associated with arrest-like restraints, the degree of intimidation
is substantially higher when they are present.
It is not to say that the use of arrest-like restraints during a lawful
Terry stop would be unreasonable; nor would a bright-line rule establishing custody where arrest-like restraints are employed make such
actions impermissible in the Miranda context.49 To the contrary, the
courts have time and again affirmed the use of reasonable force during
an investigatory stop.50 It is the potential for coercion when such actions are taken during interrogation that raises serious concerns.51
II. VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF CUSTODY AND ITS
APPLICATION TO ARREST-LIKE RESTRAINTS
This Part considers the various interpretations of Miranda custody as applied to arrest-like restraints across both federal and state
jurisdictions. The vast majority of jurisdictions apply a “totality of
the circumstances” test when considering whether a suspect is in
custody. While many of those jurisdictions consider arrest-like restraints to be only one of several factors in determining whether a
suspect is in custody, it is one that often weighs heavily in favor of
finding custody.

47. See Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1189.
48. See id. at 1190.
49. Courts require a considerable amount of coercion before finding that a lawful Terry stop has elevated into a “de facto” arrest. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a
Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 416-17
(2001). Courts grant a significant amount of deference under Terry’s framework, often finding that handcuffing, drawing weapons, or placing suspects in the back of a cop car, even
for extended periods, do not individually or collectively amount to a Fourth Amendment
violation. See id. at 417.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953 (8th Cir.
1992); United States v. Lechuga, 925 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1989).
51. See Brooke Shapiro, The Invisible Prison: Reconciling the Constitutional Doctrines
of Coercive Terry Stops and Miranda Custody, 26 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 479 (2012), for
a more detailed analysis on how the constitutional doctrines of Terry and Miranda interact
and present issues for courts on clearly articulating a definition of custody in both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts.
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A. Federal Courts
The federal courts have varied in their interpretations of custody
as applied to cases involving arrest-like restraints since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Beheler and, even more recently, since its decision
in Howes. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals briefly addressed
whether subjecting a suspect to arrest-like restraints rises to the level of custody for purposes of Miranda.52 Leshuk involved two men
who were discovered to have been growing marijuana in a rural area
in West Virginia. 53 Although arrest-like restraints were not employed, the court discussed in dicta that “drawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a suspect in a patrol car for questioning, or using or threatening to use force does not necessarily elevate a lawful
stop into a custodial arrest for Miranda purposes.”54
In United States v. Kim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s finding that custody was present where a suspect had been surrounded by police and questioned for an hour, despite the location of the questioning being her own business. 55 In
Kim, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) investigators obtained evidence that the suspect, Insook Kim, was selling large quantities of
pseudoephedrine, a primary chemical ingredient in the production of
methamphetamine, from her store.56 An investigator went to Kim’s
store and informed her of the consequences of her sales of large quantities of pseudoephedrine.57 Eight months later, investigators set up a
controlled purchase.58 After Kim’s employee sold to the undercover
cop, police entered the premises with a search warrant and handcuffed Kim’s son, who was managing the store.59 Kim, who was at
home at the time, drove to the store when she was unable to reach
her son by phone.60
When Kim arrived, the police allowed her to enter the store but
immediately sat her down and started questioning her.61 Kim was
never handcuffed but at least two officers sat or stood around her
throughout the interview, which she claimed made her feel surrounded.62 At no time during the interview was Kim read her Miran52. See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
53. Id. at 1106.
54. Id. at 1109-10 (citing United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 377-80 (4th Cir. 1984)).
55. 292 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2002).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 971-72.
62. Id. at 972.
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da rights or told that she was free to leave.63 Kim made several incriminating statements during the interview, which lasted close to an
hour.64 Kim was arrested and charged with possession and distribution of pseudoephedrine with knowledge and reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.65 The
district court granted Kim’s motion to suppress the statements made
during the interview.66
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit analyzed custody under the modified
Beheler test of whether Kim was subjected to “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”67 considering the objective circumstances of the interrogation and whether “a reasonable person would believe that he or she
was not free to leave.”68 The court noted several factors that would
likely be relevant in the analysis, such as “ ‘(1) the language used to
summon the individual; (2) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt; (3) the physical surroundings of the
interrogation; (4) the duration of the detention; and (5) the degree of
pressure applied to detain the individual.’ ” 69 The court suggested
that this list is not exclusive.70
The decision in Kim is unique to this Note because it is the only
discussed decision in which the custody inquiry did not involve a traditional arrest-like restraint (e.g., handcuffs, being placed in the back
of police car, weapons drawn). If the courts were to adopt this Note’s
proposed bright-line rule of presuming custody in cases involving arrest-like restraints, it might still be uncertain on which side of that
bright-line rule Kim would fall. There are, perhaps, several other potentially coercive restraints that could be considered arrest-like. If an
officer tells a suspect that he is under arrest and proceeds to interview him without applying any physical restraints or providing Miranda warnings, would the act of saying “you’re under arrest” be considered an arrest-like restraint? It is likely that the result will be the
same whether we determine that the suspect was subjected to arrestlike restraints and apply the proposed bright-line rule, or whether we
analyze it under any of the totality of the circumstances tests. Hypothetically, even if the Ninth Circuit had determined that being sur63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 973 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
68. Id. at 973-74 (quoting United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 580 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
69. Id. at 974 (quoting United States v. Hayden, 260 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2001)).
70. See id.
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rounded by police during the interrogation was not an arrest-like restraint, the circumstances surrounding Kim’s interrogation were
such that a reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to terminate the interview and leave, thus constituting custody under
Howes.71
In United States v. Newton, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
directly examined whether a suspect who was placed in handcuffs
was in custody for purposes of Miranda.72 Sewn Newton, a three-time
convicted felon, had agreed as part of his parole to allow his parole
officer to visit his home and to search both his person and his residence. 73 Police received a call from a social worker who informed
them that, according to Newton’s mother with whom he resided,
Newton had threatened to kill her and her husband and that he kept
a gun in a shoe box by the door of the home.74 Newton’s parole officer
was contacted and instructed to conduct a “safety search” of the
apartment.75 Six officers, including Newton’s parole officer; went to
the apartment; placed Newton, who was dressed in only his underwear, in handcuffs without advising him of his Miranda rights; and
proceeded to search the premises.76 Police brought Newton back into
the apartment, sat him down, and questioned him about any contraband he may have, to which Newton responded he only had a .22 caliber automatic firearm in a box in the corner of that room.77 After police found the weapon, Newton was placed under arrest.78
In analyzing whether Newton was in custody for purposes of Miranda, the Second Circuit turned to the free-to-leave inquiry from
Beheler.79 It noted that where a person is subjected to arrest-like restraints, specific, coercive pressures do not need to be proven to establish Miranda custody—coercive pressures are assumed. 80 The
court further elaborated that the objective standard for custody does
not require police to administer warnings on the basis of a selfassessment that their own actions are coercive, but rather, it is understood that that formal arrest or arrest-like restraints will trigger
71. This hypothetical considers how the Ninth Circuit would analyze this exact case
today under the prevailing view of Howes and, of course, after reading this Note and adopting its argument. As it may become apparent from reading this Note, none of this is currently the case.
72. 369 F.3d 659, 669-77 (2d Cir. 2004).
73. Id. at 663.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 663-64.
78. Id. at 664.
79. Id. at 670.
80. Id.

854

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:843

that requirement. 81 The court acknowledged that “[h]andcuffs are
generally recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest.”82 Although the
police advised Newton that he was not under arrest and that the restraints were being used to ensure officer safety, these statements
did not negate the coerciveness. 83 The court ultimately found that
while placing Newton in handcuffs to conduct the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, he was in custody for purposes of
Miranda.84
The application of Miranda custody to arrest-like restraints continues to vary throughout the federal courts. In Burlew v. Hedgpeth,
the Ninth Circuit found that a suspect who was placed into the back
of a patrol car and then questioned was not in custody.85 In Hedgpeth,
Deputy Sheriff James Beaupre was surveying a suspected drugmanufacturing house when the suspect in the case, Robert Burlew,
drove by in an “erratic” manner. 86 Beaupre pulled Burlew over,
searched him, and placed him into the patrol vehicle for further investigation.87 Although Burlew was informed that he was not under
arrest and was not placed in handcuffs, he was still in the back of
Beaupre’s patrol car when he made incriminating statements in response to a direct question.88 Despite this custodial-like atmosphere
and direct questioning, the court held that the lower court had not
unreasonably applied federal law in weighing the factors and in finding that Burlew was not in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements.89 Such a decision appears to be at odds with the
underlying purpose of Miranda’s safeguards. Although Burlew was
not in handcuffs, being placed into the back of a patrol car increases
the potential for coercion.
In reaching custody determinations, courts typically apply a totality of the circumstances test. The factors that a court may consider
vary from circuit to circuit. In United States v. Cowan, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied a non-exhaustive list of six factors
when it considered whether a suspect was in custody.90 Cowan involved police officers in Davenport, Iowa, who executed a warrant to
search an apartment in which they suspected crack cocaine was be81. Id. at 672.
82. Id. at 676 (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 665 (1984)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 677.
85. 448 F. App’x 663, 664 (9th Cir. 2011).
86. Burlew v. Hedgpeth, No. CIV S-08-2009 LKK CHS P., 2009 WL 2045455, at *1
(E.D. Cal. July 9, 2009) (unpublished opinion).
87. Id. at *1-2.
88. Burlew, 448 F. App’x at 664.
89. Id. at 665.
90. 674 F.3d 947, 957 (8th Cir. 2012).
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ing sold.91 During the search, the officers discovered, and subsequently handcuffed, eight adults, including Mauriosantana Cowan.92 One
of the officers frisked Cowan and asked him whether he had identification and what brought him to the apartment.93 Cowan claimed that
he had traveled by bus from Chicago; however, a further frisk of
Cowan by the police officer revealed car keys.94 When the police officer confronted Cowan about why he had car keys, Cowan responded
that he was keeping them from his girlfriend. 95 After the police
searched the apartment and discovered crack cocaine in several locations, they removed the handcuffs from Cowan and informed him
that he could leave, so long as his keys did not match any of the vehicles parked outside of the apartment.96 One of the officers pressed
Cowan’s key fob while outside of the apartment, which set off a car
alarm. 97 The police handcuffed Cowan and brought out a drugsniffing canine, which alerted the police to the presence of drugs in
Cowan’s car.98 The police searched the vehicle, discovered crack cocaine, and brought Cowan back inside the apartment, at which point
Cowan was read Miranda warnings and subsequently confessed.99
The Eighth Circuit interpreted custody as whether a reasonable
person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and
leave.100 The court considered a non-exhaustive list of six factors in
its analysis of whether Cowan was in custody, which included the
following: (1) whether police told the suspect “that the questioning
was voluntary,” the suspect could leave or ask the officers to do so,
“or that the suspect was not considered under arrest”; (2) whether
the suspect’s movement was restrained during the questioning;
(3) “whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to questions”;
(4) whether police used “strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems”
during questioning; (5) “whether the atmosphere of the questioning
was police dominated”; and (6) whether the suspect was arrested at
the end of the questioning.101
The court emphasized that the ultimate inquiry depended on
whether the suspect’s freedom to leave was restricted in any way, as
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 951.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 951.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 951-52.
Id. at 957.
Id. (quoting United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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opposed to whether questioning occurred in a coercive or policedominated environment. 102 That rationale seems inapposite when
considering the Supreme Court has clearly expressed that restriction
on freedom of movement is a necessary but insufficient condition for
establishing custody and that the focus should be on the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.103 Despite this, the court applied the factors to find that Cowan was in custody, noting that “a
reasonable person in Cowan’s position would not have felt free to end
the questioning and leave.”104
In a more recent decision, United States v. Richardson, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia discussed but failed to address whether handcuffs created a custodial effect for purposes of Miranda.105 Fourteen law enforcement agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department executed a search warrant at an apartment in southeast
D.C. in search of drugs.106 After announcing themselves and receiving
no response, the police forcibly entered the apartment.107 Once inside,
they again identified themselves and ordered all inhabitants to reveal themselves, and the suspects, Marsha Richardson and William
Hill, complied. 108 The two were searched and placed in handcuffs
while the police proceeded to search the apartment for weapons.109
The two suspects, still in handcuffs, were placed in the living room.110
Hill, being the suspected target of a larger drug conspiracy, was approached by one of the detectives soon thereafter. 111 The detective
informed Hill of the authorized search warrant, his knowledge of
Hill’s connection to another suspect that was being investigated, and
Hill’s transactions with that suspect. 112 A different detective ap-

102. Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2006)).
103. See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189-90 (2012) (“We have ‘decline[d] to accord talismanic power’ to the freedom-of-movement inquiry . . . and have instead asked the
additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” (quoting
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984))); see also Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S.
98, 112 (2010) (“Our cases make clear, however, that the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.”).
104. Cowan, 674 F.3d at 957.
105. Criminal No. 14-CR-0018 (KBJ), 2014 WL 1410890, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2014).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id.
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proached Richardson minutes later to retrieve information for identification, which Richardson calmly provided.113
Twenty minutes after the initial interaction with Richardson, the
police located a .38 caliber pistol in a black purse covered by a pink
towel.114 The police first questioned Hill, who denied ownership of the
gun.115 The search continued and Richardson, who requested to go to
the bathroom, was released from her handcuffs and escorted by one
of the few female officers on the team.116 The bathroom had not been
thoroughly searched, so the officer followed Richardson in and closed
the door behind them.117 Without the officer asking any questions,
Richardson confessed that the gun was hers.118 The officer brought
another detective into the bathroom where Richardson again admitted that the gun was hers.119 When the detective asked her to describe the weapon, she accurately told them that it was wrapped in a
pink towel inside of a black purse, but she claimed that the weapon
was for protection in her dangerous neighborhood.120 The search of
the apartment continued; however, no other evidence was found.121
The police decided to arrest Richardson for the illegal possession of a
firearm, which Richardson confessed to owning for a third time prior
to being taken away.122
The district court noted that the essential inquiry for determining
custody is whether, given the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, a reasonable person would not have felt as if he or she was “at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”123 This interpretation is at odds with the Court’s rationale in Howes. It was unlikely
that, with fourteen armed law enforcement officers, either Richardson or Hill would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation
and leave. In its analysis, the court determined that no single factor
was dispositive; it stated, rather, that consideration should be given
to the location and duration of the interrogation, the number of officers and citizens present, whether the suspects were handcuffed, and
the tone and demeanor during the actual interrogation.124
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *3.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *4.
123. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
124. See id.
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B. State Courts
The federal courts are not alone in their vague and often conflicting application of custody. The state courts, too, have wrestled with
the doctrine.125 The vast majority of the states still rely on the formalistic application of custody expressed in the Beheler decision. It is unclear whether the courts will adopt the broader interpretation of custody offered in Howes. It is clear, however, that a bright-line rule for
arrest-like restraints will reach the same result, perhaps more clearly and consistently, in the cases being decided, while mitigating the
potential for the coercive pressures of concern in Miranda. Given the
abundant and rather repetitious case law available throughout state
courts, this Note will only briefly discuss some common illustrations
and the issues they potentially raise.
In State v. Hieu Tran, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed
whether a suspect was in custody when questioned in a police cruiser.126 Vermont police received information from a victim and witnesses about an alleged assault and robbery that occurred during a drug
transaction before questioning the suspect, Hieu Tran.127 Tran was
not at his residence when the police arrived, so they followed his
mother when she went to pick him up; once they returned, the police
requested to speak with him inside of the police cruiser.128 One detective sat in the back seat, another sat in the driver’s seat, and Tran
sat in the front passenger’s seat.129 Tran was never informed whether
he was free to leave.130 The detectives questioned Tran for an hour; in
that time, he made several incriminating statements, but at no point
during the questioning was he informed of his Miranda rights. 131
Tran was arrested after the questioning. 132 The trial court subsequently granted Tran’s motion to suppress.133
On an interlocutory appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to suppress, finding that
the police conduct amounted to a custodial interrogation of the suspect without the necessary Miranda warnings.134 The court identified
several factors for consideration of custody determinations, including
125. The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is protected from abridgement by the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
126. 2012 VT 104, ¶ 1, 193 Vt. 148, 71 A.3d 1201.
127. Id. ¶ 4.
128. Id. ¶ 5.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.
132. Id. ¶ 7.
133. Id. ¶ 9.
134. Id. ¶ 13.
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(1) the location of the interview; (2) the interviewer’s communication
to the suspect of his belief in the suspect’s guilt; (3) whether the suspect arrives at the interview voluntarily; and (4) “whether the police
told the suspect that he was free to terminate the interview at any
point and leave.”135
The court applied these factors specifically to the case and determined that a coercive atmosphere was present during interrogation.136 The court included in these factors an arrest-like restraint,
namely the police cruiser.137 The closed, confined space of the police
cruiser presented a potential for coercion.138 The court admitted that
a suspect that is questioned in a car will not always be considered in
custody; however, in this case, where the police chose to interview the
suspect in the police cruiser rather than in his home and the suspect
was not informed he was free to leave, custody was present and the
suspect was entitled to Miranda warnings.139
The same year that the Vermont Supreme Court decided Hieu
Tran, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also examined the question of
arrest-like restraints in State v. Martin.140 In Martin, a Milwaukee
police sergeant approached an intersection when he observed the
suspect, Randy Martin, exit the driver’s side door of a vehicle, walk
toward another vehicle, and shout to the driver of the other vehicle,
to which the other driver responded.141 The other driver exited the
vehicle, presumably to confront Martin, but noticed the sergeant and
chose to remain near the vehicle.142 The sergeant witnessed Martin
approach the other driver and pull out an item from his pocket.143
The other driver motioned toward the sergeant and Martin placed
the item back into his pocket. 144 The sergeant immediately summoned Martin and placed him in handcuffs.145 The sergeant searched
him and discovered an expandable baton.146 Two more police officers
arrived on the scene to assist the sergeant; they ordered Martin’s
friend out of Martin’s vehicle, searched the vehicle, and discovered a

135. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Muntean, 2010 VT 88, ¶ 19, 189 Vt. 50, 12 A.3d 518).
136. The suspect was never informed that he was free to leave, he was confronted with
evidence of guilt, and he “did not voluntarily initiate contact with police.” Id. ¶¶ 15-17.
137. See id. ¶ 17.
138. See id.
139. Id. ¶ 19.
140. 2012 WI App 96, ¶ 2, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270.
141. Id. ¶ 4.
142. Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
143. Id. ¶ 5.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. ¶ 6.
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.22 caliber revolver.147 When the two men, neither of whom had received Miranda warnings, were questioned about the gun, they both
denied ownership.148 The sergeant placed Martin’s friend under arrest for possession of a concealed weapon due to the fact it was discovered underneath his seat, and after a brief exchange, Martin admitted that the gun was his.149 Despite this admission, one of the officers requested that Martin describe the gun; Martin did so accurately and was arrested as a result.150
In its analysis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first acknowledged
that custody is present for purposes of Miranda where “a reasonable
person would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave the
scene.”151 The court further stated that handcuffs would not render a
suspect in custody in all cases, such as cases involving “ ‘temporary
roadside detention’ ”; however in this case, the sergeant had placed
Martin in handcuffs for the purpose of arresting him for disorderly
conduct. 152 The court noted that under the totality of the circumstances test for custody determinations, courts consider whether the
suspect was free to leave; the purpose, location, and duration of interrogation; and the degree of restraint placed on the suspect.153 This
illustrates a common confusion between the doctrines behind Terry
and Miranda. 154 This Note’s proposed bright-line rule would not
make the use of handcuffs during a lawful Terry stop unreasonable,
but in those circumstances, the suspect should be considered in custody for purposes of Miranda.
In State v. Ortiz, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas explicitly
rejected the bright-line rule offered in this Note and yet affirmed
both lower courts’ findings of custody where handcuffs were employed.155 In Ortiz, a police officer for the Lubbock County Sheriff’s
Department was patrolling a highway when he pulled over Octavio
Ortiz, the suspect in this case, for speeding.156 After brief questioning,
the officer ordered Ortiz out of the car.157 Once outside of the vehicle,
Ortiz was further questioned, and he revealed that he was traveling
with his wife and that he was on probation for a previous drug pos-

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 33 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 35.
See supra Part I.B.
382 S.W.3d 367, 374, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Id. at 369.
Id.
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session charge.158 The officer then questioned the wife, and after her
story conflicted with Ortiz’s, the officer called for backup and asked
to search the vehicle, to which Ortiz consented.159 While the officer
searched the vehicle, the backup officer who had just arrived began
to frisk Ortiz’s wife.160 When she tried to avoid the search, the backup
officer handcuffed her.161 After discovering something on Ortiz’s wife,
one of the officers handcuffed Ortiz and asked him if he knew what it
was; he admitted it was cocaine.162 The trial court suppressed Ortiz’s
statements after finding that he was in custody when he admitted to
the drugs and that the officers failed to read him his Miranda
rights.163 On an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.164
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed custody objectively, considering whether a reasonable person would have viewed
the detention as being a restraint on movement comparable to a formal arrest.165 The court used a totality of the circumstances test to
determine whether a reasonable person under the same circumstances would have believed his freedom of movement was restricted to a
degree similar to formal arrest.166 It noted that the subjective belief of
the officers was only relevant to the custody analysis if the officers
manifested a belief to the individual being detained that he was in
fact a suspect.167 In considering the factors in the case, the court went
on to dispel any concern that the court of appeals had adopted a categorical rule for handcuffs that would automatically amount to custody.168 It expressly stated that “the court of appeals properly relied on
handcuffing as only one of a range of relevant factors in its determination.”169 The court relied on the Howes test for custody—one of the
few state opinions that has done so—in affirming the decision of the
court of appeals.170 Ortiz was handcuffed immediately after viewing
his wife get handcuffed and frisked.171 Based on the officers’ actions,
Ortiz could have reasonably inferred that he was being associated

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 371.
Id.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id. at 374 n.35.
Id. at 374.
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with the criminal behavior of his wife.172 The traffic stop had elevated
into a custodial arrest in which Ortiz was entitled to Miranda
rights.173
In all three cases, the same result arguably would have occurred if
the courts had applied a bright-line rule for arrest-like restraints.
The interpretation and analysis of custody varies only marginally in
other opinions from other jurisdictions. However, the presence of arrest-like restraints often has the same effect in those cases—the
scales are tipped heavily in favor of finding custody.
III. ABANDONING A “TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES”
TEST FOR A CLEAR, BRIGHT-LINE RULE
Miranda was intended to be a bright-line, prophylactic rule. 174
One of the principle rationales behind the Miranda opinion was to
provide law enforcement and courts with clarity in the application of
its rule.175 However, the various interpretations of custody across jurisdictions clearly demonstrate a growing need for further clarification. The current totality of the circumstances test, even under
Howes, only exacerbates the potential for contradictions and circuit
splits. A bright-line rule with regards to finding custody when there
are arrest-like restraints meets both aims of the original doctrine by
being clear and simple while ensuring that police do not coerce suspects into confessing.176 Additionally, a bright-line rule would relieve
the courts of the task of analyzing each individual case.177
While it is difficult to establish a bright-line rule for custody that
would not be over- or under-inclusive, it is possible for the courts to
carve out a rule applicable to the circumstances described in the cases in Part II. This is the area where the former test for custody under
Beheler and the recent test for custody under Howes meet: arrest-like
restraints. Under Howes, the Court distinguished arrest from custody, which under Beheler had been treated as functionally interchangeable. It has become readily apparent over the years that the
concerns of Miranda over the potential for a coercive, police172. Id. at 374-75.
173. Id. at 375.
174. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) (“We have repeatedly emphasized the virtues of a bright-line rule in cases following . . . Miranda.” (citing several
authorities)).
175. Id. at 680 (“A major purpose of the Court's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona . . . was
‘to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.’ ‘As we have stressed on numerous occasions, “[o]ne of the principal advantages” of
Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application.’ ” (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
425 (1986))).
176. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 421 (1984).
177. See id.

2015]

APPLYING THE ’CUFFS

863

dominated atmosphere during custodial interrogations can be present whether or not the individual has been formally arrested.
The proposed bright-line rule to be applied is one that is relatively
simple: any individual subjected to arrest-like restraints—such as
being placed in handcuffs or into the back of a police car, or having
weapons drawn on him—is in custody for purposes of Miranda. A
court should then inquire whether the suspect was subjected to interrogation for purposes of Miranda while in custody. It will not always
be the case that a Miranda violation has occurred under the scope of
this rule when a suspect has been subjected to arrest-like restraints.
If a Miranda violation has occurred, then the burden will shift to the
government, who is in a better position to prove that an exception to
Miranda applies or that the statements should be excluded.
Even if a court were to find that a suspect is in custody, failing to
apprise the suspect of his Miranda rights will not automatically bar
the admissibility of evidence obtained through interrogation. It cannot be overstated that the Court has reaffirmed the core holding of
Miranda as a constitutional decision that is subject to several exceptions.178 These exceptions allow for the establishment of a bright-line
rule in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
It was not long after Miranda established safeguards against the
inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation that the Court began
establishing exceptions to its general rule. In analyzing the rationale
behind Miranda, the Court has found that certain circumstances are
not covered by the general rule because the coercive pressures are
not likely to be present. The Miranda opinion specifically acknowledged that the Fifth Amendment does not bar statements freely volunteered, allowing for their admissibility whether or not warnings
were given.179 The bright-line rule proposed in this Note would only
be sufficient to establish custody and would not detract from the inquiry of whether there was interrogation. If a suspect were to be
placed in handcuffs and immediately confess before any questioning
has occurred, it would be unlikely that the confession would be excluded under any analysis. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment does not
extend its protections to the examination of real, physical evidence,
because there is no communicative act by the suspect.180
If the concerns over adopting a bright-line rule in favor of presumptive custody for cases involving arrest-like restraints are that it
would exclude more evidence and serve as a straightjacket in police
178. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).
179. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
180. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (holding that petitioner’s
blood sample was not a communicative act of the petitioner and therefore presented no
concern of “testimonial compulsion”).
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work, the actual application of the exclusionary rule181 should ease
those concerns. The exclusionary rule serves as a deterrent against
negligent and bad police conduct.182 However, this assumes that the
police acted in bad faith and as a result an individual was deprived of
his or her constitutional rights. 183 A suspect’s constitutional right
against self-incrimination is violated by the introduction of unwarned
statements against him or her at trial, not by the failure to inform
the suspect of his rights.184 When the police negligently, or even deliberately, fail to provide Miranda warnings to a suspect, any statements made in violation of Miranda may be excluded, but the “physical fruit” obtained by the statements will not.185 This denotes an important limitation within Fifth Amendment privilege: it is only applicable to self-incrimination.186 Additionally, the mere failure to inform
a suspect of his Miranda rights does not exclude the physical evidence obtained from those statements, because the Fifth Amendment’s focus on protecting against self-incrimination is limited to testimonial evidence.187
The proposed bright-line rule works well with the exceptions to
provide law enforcement with clarity in decision-making and remedies for potential Miranda violations. The police may potentially remove a suspect from custody by removing the arrest-like restraint or,
more logically, by providing the suspect with Miranda warnings.
Even in a situation where a suspect is subjected to arrest-like restraints, not read Miranda warnings, and subsequently makes incriminating statements during interrogation, all is not lost for obtaining evidence from that suspect specifically. So long as the police acted
in good faith, they could administer Miranda warnings and any
statements made thereafter would likely be admissible, assuming
that they were made voluntarily.188
181. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that operates to deter constitutional violations. Jack A. Levy, The Exclusionary Rule, 85 GEO. L.J. 969, 970 (1997).
When applied, it bars the government from introducing evidence obtained in violation of
the defendant’s constitutional rights into the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Id. at 969-70.
182. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
183. See id.
184. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643-44 (2004) (holding that a police
officer’s failure to warn a suspect of his Miranda rights during an arrest did not warrant
suppression at trial of a weapon discovered through the suspect’s statements).
185. Id. at 644.
186. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is applicable only where a constitutional
violation has occurred. Michael A. Cantrell, Constitutional Penumbras and Prophylactic
Rights: The Right to Counsel and the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 111,
115-16 (2013). A Miranda violation is not necessarily a constitutional violation because the
rule provided by Miranda is not in the text of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
187. See Patane, 542 U.S. at 643-44.
188. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (“[A] suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his
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Even in cases where there has been a Miranda violation, the exclusionary rule has not been applied with strict force. The statements
are still admissible for the purpose of impeachment on the rationale
that Miranda does not grant a criminal defendant the right to commit perjury.189 Certainly nothing in a bright-line rule would affect
the exception for impeachment.
Out of the several exceptions to Miranda, arguably none play as
large of a role in Fifth Amendment custody determinations as the
public safety exception. For that reason, it may remedy the potential
issues of over- and under-inclusiveness present in the proposed
bright-line rule in this Note. The Court held in New York v. Quarles
that law enforcement officers could forego Miranda warnings in exigent circumstances where the “threat to the public safety outweighs
the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against self-incrimination.”190 The rationale behind the public safety exception is that police should not be placed in a position
where they will have to make judgment calls, often under pressure
and time constraints, of whether to issue the suspect warnings or
take the chance that some probative evidence may then be rendered
inadmissible.191 In such situations, an arrest-like restraint offers police the best option to neutralize any threat the suspect may impose,
but it seldom would neutralize all threats imposed in that situation.
This would not detract from the fact that the suspect is in custody for
purposes of Miranda, but the government would not be penalized as
a result of the exception.
The public safety exception should have some limitations such
that it will not to render this Note’s proposed rule or Miranda, for
that matter, ineffectual. The public safety exception is generally concerned with the welfare of the public; therefore, where the premises
have been secured and the suspect(s) no longer pose any direct
threats to officer safety, any pre-Miranda questioning should fall
outside of the scope of Quarles.192 Under this application, the exception and the rule complement one another, balancing policy concerns
of effective and efficient policing with the protection of individual
constitutional rights.
rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.”). But see
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the deliberate
two-step strategy has been used, postwarning statements that are related to the substance
of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before the
postwarning statement is made.”).
189. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
190. 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984).
191. Id. at 657-58.
192. Rorie A. Norton, Matters of Public Safety and the Current Quarrel Over the Scope
of the Quarles Exception to Miranda, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1961-62 (2010).
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CONCLUSION
This Note’s proposed bright-line rule in favor of presuming custody in cases involving arrest-like restraints would provide for consistency in custody determinations across jurisdictions and would
further the aim of Miranda: protecting Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination during inherently coercive custodial interrogations. 193 Moreover, law enforcement and courts would benefit
from clarity in the application of the rule, while avoiding the overand under-inclusiveness that traditionally plague bright-line rules as
a result of the established exceptions to Miranda. Even under the
current Howes test for custody, it is likely that a court would find
custody where arrest-like restraints are employed. It is therefore reasonable for the United States Supreme Court to adopt this Note’s
proposed bright-line rule.

193. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (“Procedural safeguards must
be employed to protect the [Fifth Amendment] privilege.”).

